This is an interesting study that looks at the cognitive features associated with radicalism, especially "dogmatic intolerance." People with dogmatic leanings tend to have unreasonably high confidence, what the article describes as "unjustified certainty," in their own judgements, even after repeated mistakes. This was tested with a simple comparison exercise: subjects were shown clusters of dots and asked to judge which cluster was the biggest, and to rate their own confidence in each judgement. The dogmatists scored high confidence, and it stayed high, regardless of any feedback they received.
From the summary:
here we show that individuals holding radical beliefs (as measured by questionnaires about political attitudes) display a specific impairment in metacognitive sensitivity about low-level perceptual discrimination judgments. Specifically, more radical participants displayed less insight into the correctness of their choices and reduced updating of their confidence when presented with post-decision evidence. Our use of a simple perceptual decision task enables us to rule out effects of previous knowledge, task performance, and motivational factors underpinning differences in metacognition. Instead, our findings highlight a generic resistance to recognizing and revising incorrect beliefs as a potential driver of radicalization.
The article also emphasizes that the cause is not simply over-confidence. The key finding is that radicals fail to accurately assess their own mistakes and adjust their confidence accordingly:
These results show that more dogmatic people manifest a lowered capacity to discriminate between their correct and incorrect decisions, after controlling for differences in both primary task performance and confidence bias. We obtained a qualitatively similar pattern for authoritarianism (see Figure 3B), with trends of reduced metacognitive sensitivity (study 2: β = 0.11, p = 0.051; study 3: β = −0.08, one-tailed p = 0.08), but no relation with perceptual performance or confidence bias (all p values > 0.17). Across both facets of radicalism, this failure in metacognition was driven by radicals holding unreasonably high confidence in incorrect decisions compared to moderates (Figures 4B and S4). Metacognitive Failure as a Feature of Those Holding Radical Beliefs
Rollwage, Dollan, Fleming. iCurrent Biology[/I]. Dec. 2018.